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Abstract
Using a firm-bank panel of more than 1m German firms over 2010-2016, we document that
local public bank lending to municipalities crowds out private investment. Our results show how
crowding-out can happen in a developed economy characterized by low interest rates and fis-
cal austerity. Our mechanism relies on two structural features of Germany’s banking landscape:
First, the geographical segmentation of credit markets for small and medium firms (SME) which
are dominated by local banks. Secondly, a special statutory mandate requiring local public banks
to lend to municipalities. With yields on local government debt declining to all-time lows, local
public banks tried to alleviate stress on their balance sheets by using their local market power
to charge higher rates on their SME customers. This crowded out firm investment. Perversely,
fiscal consolidation at the state and federal levels contributed to this effect by putting pressure
on the budgets of municipal governments which increasingly borrowed from local public banks.
Crowding-out lowered aggregate private investment by around 30-40 bio euros per year (or 1 per-
cent of GDP). Thus, we identify a novel channel through which low interest rates can adversely
affect bank lending and firm performance. Our results also illustrate how segmented credit mar-
kets can amplify negative multiplier effects from fiscal austerity.
Keywords: local public finance, firm-level investment, crowding-out, fiscal austerity, global and
intra-European imbalances
JEL-codes: E62, F21, F32, H32
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1 Introduction
Germany’s exceptional growth over the last decadewas accompanied by declining private investment.
This trend has also contributed to the country’s high current account surplus that is widely perceived
as an important source of intra-European and even global imbalances andhas thereforemoved into the
focus of international policy-makers.
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In this paper, we draw attention to two important explanatory
factors for Germany’s low private investment rate that, so far, have not been explored in the context
of advanced economies: the local segmentation of credit markets and the role of local public banks in
local public finance.
Local public banks dominate lending to small and medium firms (SME) in Germany and, at the
same time, also have an explicit mandate to lend to the local public sector. As interest rates (and in-
termediation spreads) on municipal debt declined after the global financial crisis, this requirement to
engage in municipal lending effectively tied up a large part of local public banks’ balance sheet in ac-
tivities with practically zero margin. This put stress on the balance sheet of local public banks that
they tried to alleviate by charging higher interest rates to their SME customers. Since SMEs could not
easily switch lender in geographically segmented lendingmarkets, they invested less. We estimate that
this form of ‘local crowding out‘ lowered aggregate private investment in Germany by around 30-40
bio euros per year (or 1 percent of GDP).
Perversely, fiscal consolidation at the state and federal levels substantially contributed to crowding
out because it led to additional pressure on the budgets of municipal governments which were forced
to plug the gaps by borrowing from local public banks. We use exogenous variation in the state-level
fiscal consolidation needs stipulated by the constitutional debt brake as instrument for local public
banks’ holdings of municipal debt. These IV results show that Germany’s fiscal austerity over the last
decade can account for three quarters of the crowding out of private investment in our sample.
While the notion of crowding out in locally segmented credit markets (local crowding out) has re-
cently been prominently documented for a major emerging economy, China (Huang et al. (2020)), our
results provide important first evidence on local crowding out for an advanced economy. Importantly,
they showhow such crowding out can take place in a low-interest rate environment. At amore general
1
The European Commission has repeatedly criticized the macroeconomic imbalances in Germany, see for example
European Commission (2019). On May 30th, 2017, US president Donald Trump tweeted: “We have a MASSIVE trade
deficit with Germany. (...) Very bad for U.S. This will change” (Trump, 2017).
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level, we therefore also identify a novel mechanism through which low interest rates can have adverse
effects on real economic activity. Last but not least, our results also illustrate how the negative multi-
plier effects from fiscal austerity at higher (federal and state) level of government can be exacerbated
in imperfect and segmented credit markets.
Germany’s local banks come in two forms: local public banks (the ‘Sparkassen‘ or savings banks)
and local cooperative banks (theVolksbanken). Together, they dominate local bankingmarkets in large
parts of the country. They have designated geographical areas of business in which other banks of the
same type (savings or cooperative) are not allowed to compete. This institutional backdrop—the so-
called “Regionalprinzip” (regional principle)—implies that German banking markets are segmented
along regional or municipal boundaries. Their dense branch network gives local banks a very strong
presence in local markets that the big nationwide banks (mainly Deutsche Bank with its Postbank
subsidiary andCommerzbank) cannotmatch. InGermany, only 29% of credit to firms and households
stem from private banks, a comparatively low value (Gilquin, 2014).
The local segmentation of Germany’s banking markets is particularly strong in lending to small
and medium enterprises (SME). Many small German firms have long-standing relations with their
local banks which are often their only bank connections. This relationship-based model is widely
praised and the local banks pride themselves of it in their own publicity. Arguably, it allows the bank
to screen borrowers much more closely and to continue lending to distressed firms even when arm’s
length lenders would long have stopped to provide credit. On the other hand, relationship lending
also leads to a well-known hold-up problem (Sharpe, 1990): over the course of the relationship, the
lender acquires private information about the borrower—and often holds the best collateral—which
makes it hard for the borrowing firm to switch lender if the lender tightens loan terms.
While local cooperative and savings banks have a very similar clientele of private firms, the savings
banks, also play an important role in local public finance, including direct lending tomunicipalities and
lending to local public enterprises. Differently from their local cooperative competitors, the savings
banks have a statutory mandate to lend to the public sector. The savings banks are also under direct
control of the municipalities in their respective district, with local mayors and other high-ranked of-
ficials being ex-officio members of their supervisory boards. This makes it hard for the savings banks
to decline financing requests from the municipalities in their district.
The local segmentation of Germany’s bankingmarkets and the role of savings banks for local pub-
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lic finance are long-standing institutional features of Germany’s banking landscape. We argue that
there are two related reasons that explain why these features have started to matter for crowding out
over the last decade in particular. First, as the municipal spread—the difference between interest rates
on municipal borrowing rates and deposit rates—has declined over the last decade, it has become
less and less attractive for banks to lend to municipalities. However, savings banks’ statutory public
lending requirement did not allow them to reduce municipal loans by much. Low interest rates also
made it difficult for deposit-dependent local public banks to attract additional funding. Therefore,
the statutory public lending requirement created an increasing shadow cost on their balance sheets
that they rolled over into increased interest rates for their least elastic private borrowers: SMEs who
rely on relationship-based bank finance in locally segmented credit markets. The second reason—
compounding the effect of low interest rates—was the deteriorationof the fiscal situation ofGermany’s
municipalities over the last decade. As we discuss below, this was caused by the consolidation of state-
and federal budgets which happened at the expense of local municipalities. This created additional
demand for municipal loans that local savings banks had to satisfy, thus exacerbating the crowding
out of private-sector lending.
2
To guide our empirical analysis, we propose a stylized theoretical model in the spirit of Brunner-
meier and Koby (2019). In the model banks face constraints on lengthening their balance sheet. This
constraint means that savings banks’ statutory public lending constraint becomes binding once mu-
nicipal loan demand increases or if municipal borrowing rates decline. The binding statutory lending
requirement induces a shadow cost that the bank seeks to make up for by increasing rates in the local
market for private lending where it has market power. Consistent with this theory, we find that SME
lending rates of local public banks increases significantly in the share of their lending to local govern-
ments and with falling public sector borrowing rates. This link is absent for the control group of local
cooperative bankswhich do not have a statutory public lendingmandate. Hence, savings banks charge
their customers a spread over what comparable local cooperative banks charge their very similar cus-
tomer firms. We refer to this spread as the break-even spread.
We then ask to what extent the break-even spreads charged by savings banks affect firm-level in-
vestment. Our firm-level analysis is based on a unique German firm-level panel that covers more
2
This may raise the question why municipal spreads do not reflect the potential risks associated with lending to dis-
tressed municipalities. Under the Basel framework, loans to German municipalities have a risk weight of zero because
local governments cannot declare bankruptcy under German law (their debt is legally guaranteed by the federal state).
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than 1m German firms over the period from 2010 until 2016, including many small ones not covered
by other data sets. Our data also contains rich information on firms’ bank relations that we use to
construct a firm-specific measure to the break-even spreads charged by savings banks. We call this
measure of exposure the firm’s local public bank spread.
We argue that a firm’s local public bank spread is exogenous to firm-specific characteristics because
the individual break-even rates that enter it are computed using bank-level information only. Further-
more, because the firm-specific local bank spread exploits variation between firms and over time in
firms’ bank relations it is orthogonal to most conceivable confounding factors such as time-varying
local- or sector-specific demand spillovers or unobserved firm or bank heterogeneity.
We show that the local public bank spread has a quantitatively important and significantly negative
effect on firm level investment controlling for a host of firm-level variables and a rich set of controls for
potential confounding factors. Specifically, our main specification controls for firm effects as well as
for time-varying region-sector specific effects. This effectively accounts for compositional differences
in the customer base of local banks. Hence, already in our baseline OLS estimates we can largely rule
out that the effect of the local bank spread on investment arises because local banks in some areas lend
to particularly small or risky firms or to some specifically risky sectors which would justify charging
an interest rate spread even in the absence of our conjectured mechanism.
To fully account for any remaining reverse causality between firm investment and the financing
conditions set by local public banks, in addition, we use a granular instrumental variable approach as
recently proposed by Gabaix and Koijen (2020). To this end, we purge local public bank spreads for
unobserved factors that could be correlated with firm-level outcomes and that could affect different
banks in a heterogeneous manner. Following Gabaix and Koijen (2020), we then construct an instru-
ment from the granular residuals of this factor analysis. In this way we can fully dispel any concern
that banks counterbalance particularly risky firm portfolios with high public lending shares or that
risky, low-investment firms select to local public banks because no other banks would lend to them.
These granular IV results confirm our earlier findings, both qualitatively and quantitatively.
We further buttress the causal interpretation of our findings by inspecting the transmissionmech-
anism. First, we show that firms that face a higher local public bank spread see lower bank lending
growth and pay slightly higher interest rates. Secondly, simple theorywould suggest that crowding out
is possible only if local demand for public borrowing can impact interest rates for other borrowers in
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the local economy. This requires local bankingmarkets to be geographically segmented because other-
wise borrowers could easily substitute local bank credit for alternative sources of finance. Consistent
with this view, we document that our findings for investment, firm’s bank borrowing and the aver-
age interest they pay are particularly strong in areas with strong geographical segmentation in which
local public banks account for a high share of bank-firm relations. In the same vein, our findings are
stronger for firms that are arguablymore dependent on bank credit and find it harder to switch lender:
younger or smaller firms and firms with fewer bank connections or a lack of internal funds.
Finally, to confirm that our results are driven by the special role of Germany’s savings banks in
municipal finance, we re-run our analysis using a placebo-sample in which firms’ exposures are cal-
culated based on break-even spreads imputed for our control group of local cooperative banks. Here,
none of our previous results hold.
Our findings therefore suggest that local bank lending to the public sector crowds out private
sector investment. The effect is economically important: according to our estimates, an increase in the
local bank spread by 100 bps lowers investment for the average firm in our sample by about 6 percent.
While many of the firms in our sample are small, the effect on Germany’s aggregate investment—and
therefore on the current account balance—is still considerable. We find that over our sample period,
aggregate investment would have been, on average, 30-40 billion Euro per year higher in the absence
of crowding out. This amounts to roughly 1 percent of German GDP per year.
Over the last decade, Germany’s federal states and the federal government have tightened their
spending under the influence of the so-called debt brake. Introduced into the federal constitution
and most individual state constitutions in 2010, the debt brake stipulates that the federal government
should not run a structural deficit of more than 0.35% of GDP from 2016, whereas the federal states
should not incur any structural deficit at all beginning in 2020.
Against this backdrop of fiscal austerity, it may appear surprising that we find any evidence of
crowding out in Germany at all. We argue that fiscal austerity at the state- and federal levels and the
financial distress of many municipalities are actually two sides of the same coin. In the process of
fiscal consolidation stipulated by the debt brake, the federal and state governments have shifted many
expensive government tasks to the municipalities, whose debt is explicitly exempted from the debt
brake. Since municipalities’ ability to raise taxes is very limited, their fiscal situation worsened.
Germany’s recent experience with fiscal austerity therefore also allows us to answer to what ex-
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tent the debt brake and the consolidation of state and federal budgets at the expense of municipalities
can account for the crowding out we see in firm-level data. To this end, we use the consolidation
needs of state-level budgets imposed by the debt brake to gauge the fiscal pressure that states pass on
to municipalities. We interact state-level consolidation needs with a municipality’s fiscal situation at
the beginning of the sample as instrument for the share of public lending on savings banks’ balance
sheets. We then repeat our firm-level analysis based on local public banks spreads constructed from
instrumented public lending shares. This analysis confirms our earlier results and suggests that the
debt brake alone accounts for roughly three quarters of the crowding out of private investment that
we observe over our sample period.
Our findings therefore document a new channel through which fiscal austerity—and notably debt
brakes—can have contractionary effects. We conjecture that our results could be relevant in other
settings. Many countries with federal systems of government (including e.g. the United States) have
two-chamber systems inwhich federal and state level have to agree on anymeasures for fiscal consoli-
dation andmany of these countries have debt brakes at the state or federal levels. In such settings, there
will always be an incentive to shift the burden of fiscal adjustment to lower levels of government that
do not have direct parliamentary representation. Our results suggest that this may lead to substantial
crowding out if lower levels of government then finance their borrowing needs in locally segmented
credit markets (which are also hallmark of banking systems in many countries).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 takes a first look at the data and section 3 embeds our
paper into the literature. Section 4 describes our bank- and firm-level data sets. It also introduces our
theoretical and empirical framework and discusses identification. Section 5 presents our main firm-
level results. In section 6 discuss the role of fiscal austerity at the state- and federal levels formunicipal
finances and provide results of the IV analysis. In section 7 we explore extensions and provide further
robustness checks. Section 8 concludes.
2 A first look at the data and the mechanism
In this section we take a first look at the data to motivate the central elements of our mechanism.
One important motivation for our analysis is Germany’s external surplus which has been rising
considerably since the global financial crisis. Our argument in this paper is that Germany’s current ac-
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count surplus is at least in part the result of low levels of private investment and that low investment,
in turn, is partly the result of crowding out in Germany’s locally segmented bankingmarkets. Figure 1
plotsGermany’s current account balance and its composition in terms of sectoral net lending of house-
holds, non-financial and financial corporations and of the government. As is apparent, the country has
been running increasing current account surpluses since the late 1990s. Turning to the composition
of the current account surplus, we see that in the years before the financial crisis it is predominantly
the shrinking deficit of the public sector that drives the surplus. However, net non-financial corporate
lending soars during the global financial crisis and remains high thereafter. Interestingly, this is also
the period when the net lending of the government sector turns positive (after temporarily turning
negative during the financial crisis). In the following we argue that the consolidation of (federal and
state-level) public finances led to a deterioration in the financial situation of local municipalities. This
increased pressure on local savings banks to lend to municipalities, crowding out of private invest-
ment in locally segmented credit markets. This contributed to the increase in corporate net saving
that we observe in Figure 1.
Our mechanism crucially relies on the local segmentation of Germany’s credit markets. The map
in Figure 2 shows the county-level variation in the share of firms with a local bank relationship in
our sample. While the figure reveals considerable regional variation, its predominantly dark colour
suggest that inmany areas local banks are themain—and often only—provider of credit to SMEs. This
dominance of local banks in their respective markets is one of the key elements of the mechanism we
highlight in this paper. Not only are many SMEs probably too small and too opaque to borrow from
the bigger, nationwide bankswhich are arms’ length lenders. Themap suggest that inmany areas local
banks are actually the “only game in town”. This leaves SMEs highly exposed to changes in funding
conditions imposed by the local banks.
Figure 3 illustrates the role of savings banks in local public finance. It plots a municipality’s debt
level (relative to GDP) against the public lending share on local bank’s balance sheet. There is a clear
positive relation but it is presentmainly for the savings banks not for the cooperative banks. There are
several important conclusions from this figure. First, it illustrates that public sector lending by sav-
ings banks is essential to local municipalities and their connected enterprises. Secondly, it shows that
there is considerable variation in themunicipal lending shares of savings banks. Third, ourmechanism
requires that there is a certain rivalry between lending to SMEs and to municipalities. If local pub-
7
lic banks could elastically accomodate any municipal demand for credit by lengthening their balance
sheet, wewould not see any crowding out. In fact, Germany’s local banks are highly dependent on local
deposits. The typical savings banks will not be able to fully refinance increased municipal borrowing
by simply lengthening its balance sheet proportionally. Figure 3 provides suggestive prima facie evi-
dence to support this view. Increased borrowing by municipalities not only increases the amount of
municipal lending by savings banks but also the share of this lending in savings banks’ balance sheet.
Another important ingredient of our mechanisms is that the decline in public sector borrowing
rates has made it less attractive for banks to lend to municipal borrowers. Figure 4 shows time series
for the municipal bond rate and the average deposit rate of German banks. The difference between
these series—to which we refer as the municipal spread—has fallen to virtually zero over the period
since the global financial crisis.
This fall in the municipal spread (and the concurrent deterioration of local public finances) has
affected savings banks more than other banks because their statutes require them to engage in munic-
ipal lending. Given the length of the banks’ balance sheet, this leads to a high shadow cost in terms
of forgone lending to more lucrative borrowers. We argue that this shadow cost has induced public
banks to try to break even by charging higher rates on their other customers. Figure 5 illustrates this
point. It plots the firm lending rates of local banks (cooperative and public) against municipal lending
shares for selected years in our sample.
Consistent with our hypothesis that high levels of public lending adversely affect financing con-
ditions for local SMEs, a higher public loan share is associated with a significantly higher average
firm-lending rate for the public savings banks. Conversely, the cooperative banks —which have no
statutory requirement to lend to the public sector—generally havemuch lower public loan shares than
the savings banks and the correlation between the firm-lending rate and the public loan share is gen-
erally weakly negative and not statistically significant. Note also that the slope of this relation for the
savings banks is becoming steeper over time, as we would expect—declining municipal lending rates




Contrasting the findings in Figure 5 for savings banks with those obtained for the cooperative banks already allows us
to effectively rule out an alternative explanation for a positive correlation between banks’ municipal lending share and the
average firm-lending rate: that local public banks in regions where SME lending is riskier (whichwould be associated with
higher firm-lending rates) offset the impact of this risk on their balance sheets with higher public loan shares. Cooperative
banks and savings banks have a very similar customer base of borrowers and are generally active in the same local markets.
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3 Contribution to the literature
Our paper integrates and builds on several strands of literature. Foremost, we contribute to a nascent
literature on local crowding out. Using Chinese city- and firm-level data, Huang et al. (2020) show
that private firms in cities with high levels of local government debt have lower investment while
state-owned firms do not. Like ours, the mechanism explored by Huang et al. (2020) relies on the local
segmentation of credit markets. However, our analysis differs from and extends Huang et al. (2020) in
several important dimensions. The first is the institutional setting. Ours is the first paper to provide
firm-level evidence of local crowding out in the context of a developed economy. Secondly, our use of
matched bank-firm data allows us to put the crowding-out mechanism under the microscope. Specif-
ically, Huang et al. (2020) cannot answer the question if bank lending to local government crowds
out firm-level lending directly by reducing credit to firms connected to a specific bank or if it does
so through a general equilibrium effect in which increased credit demand by local governments leads
to a general increase in interest rates in the local credit market. Our bank-firm-level analysis allows
us to show that crowding out takes place directly on individual banks’ balance sheet through a tight-
ening of credit conditions for the bank’s firm customers. In so doing, our approach to identification
exploits the unique institutional setting of Germany’s banking system. There are two types of local
banks in Germany, local public banks (the ‘Sparkassen‘ or savings banks) and the local cooperative
banks (‘Volksbanken‘). Both serve the same local markets and a very similar base of private customers
and small businesses. However, local public banks face a statutory public lending requirement and are
under direct political control of local and municipal governments, a constraint that local cooperative
banks do not face. This makes the local cooperative banks and their customers an important con-
trol group that helps us greatly in identifying the causal effect of higher municipal lending on private
investment.
The idea that some form of financial repression by governments can reduce private sector lend-
ing has recently been explored by Becker and Ivashina (2018) who show that banks’ lending to their
respective governments increased during the European sovereign debt crisis and that this led to re-
duction in corporate credit during this major recession. Our results here complement those of Becker
It is therefore implausible that the savings banks generally have riskier loan portfolios than their cooperative counterparts
and that they should display a stronger tendency than cooperative banks to offset this balance sheet risk with a higher
share of notionally safe public sector loans. In our firm-bank-level analysis below, we formally dispel this concern using a
granular instrumental variable procedure.
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and Ivashina (2018) by showing that—due to the segmentation of local banking markets—there is
intra-national variation in the strength of this crowding out channel and that its economic cost is
primarily borne by the least elastic customers, i.e. small and medium sized companies. Importantly,
we show how crowding out could happen against the backdrop of a booming German economy of the
last decade and of secularly low interest rates.
In its use of matched bank-firm data, our analysis builds on the seminal work by Khwaja andMian
(2008) and the literature spawned by this paper. Huber (2018) examines how an exogenous shock to
Commerzbank, one of Germany’s few big private banks, affected its dependent firms and counties in
the aftermath of the financial crisis. While we make use of the same data source, our analysis benefits
from access to historic volumes to obtain time-varying bank connections. Popov and Rocholl (2018)
show that external financing shocks to savings banks lead to a decline in labor demand of firms which
are connected to savings banks. Related, Bian et al. (2017) show thatGerman firmswith a government-
owned bank as their main bank have lower innovation rates.
While these papers focus on credit supply shocks that adversely affect the length of the balance
sheet of banks, our paper draws attention to how local banks’ mandate to engage inmunicipal lending
imposes constraints on the composition of savings banks’ balance sheets and thus lead to reduced
lending to firm customers ceteris paribus. At amethodological level, our analysis specifically addresses
some potential biases that could arise in studies using bank-firm level data, e.g. because firms sort to
specific banks or because there is some other form of reverse causality from firm characteristics to
bank balance sheets. We do so by exploiting the unique information about the sectoral composition of
bank portfolios that is implicit in our data set to construct a granular instrumental variable following
the lead of Gabaix and Koijen (2020).
4
One of our key contributions to show that (and how) crowding out can happen against the back-
drop of a secular decline in interest rates. In our setting declining municipal borrowing rates exacer-
bate the statutory public lending constraints of local public banks and thus impose a shadow cost that
they try to roll over to their customers. Our analysis therefore directly relates to recent studies that
have investigated the impact of low and negative interest rates on bank behavior (Heider et al. (2019),
Brunnermeier and Koby (2019), Balloch and Koby (2019), Basten and Mariathasan (2018)).
4
Pinardon-Touati (2020) showshow someof these challenges can be overcomeusing loan-level data instead. Her results
confirm ours by documenting a bank-lending channel of crowding out in French data.
10
Heider et al. (2019) show that banks thatmainly rely ondeposit funding (i.e. are deposit-dependent)
are particularly hit by the introduction of negative interest rates in the euro area. These banks cannot
easily pass on negative rates to customers which implies comparatively higher cost of funding. As a
consequence, deposit-dependent banks increase their interest rates and reduce lending.
Brunnermeier and Koby (2019) offer an elegant theoretical analysis of the impact of persistently
low interest rates on bank lending. They show that the impact of interest rates on bank lending is
not monotonic, i.e. there exists a minimum level of monetary policy rates, referred to as the reversal
rate, below which bank credit supply starts to decrease. We propose an extension of Brunnermeier’s
and Koby’s model by adding a statutory public lending constraint to the banks problem. This model
provides guidance for our empirical analysis.
Balloch and Koby (2019) examine the long-run impact of low interest rates on bank profitability
and bank lending in Japanese data and find that the effect of low rates is particularly pernicious for
deposit-dependent banks. In our empirical setting, both types of local banks—cooperative banks and
savings banks—are deposit-dependent and, as shown by Heider et al. (2019), their business models
have been affected by declining monetary policy rates. We add to these papers by arguing that the
ability of savings banks to adjust to declining interest margins is particularly constrained by their
mandate to engage in municipal lending. Coupled with the local segmentation of banking markets,
this leads to a crowding out of private sector lending and thus of private investment. This aspect of
low interest rates has not been discussed in the literature so far. Our results show that this effect is
quantitatively important. Our mechanism is potentially relevant in other settings as well since public
sector banks are a feature of the banking landscape in many countries.
Our analysis is also informed by a number of recent papers that have shown that lending decisions
of Germany’s savings banks are subject to political influence. Englmaier and Stowasser (2017) docu-
ment an electoral cycle in the lending of Germany’s savings banks. Markgraf and Rosas (2019) show
thatmayors who sit on the boards of German savings banks aremore likely to get re-elected than their
peers who are not board members. Koetter and Popov (2018) suggest that local governments try to
curry favor with state-level governments of a different party by letting their savings banks increase
their holding of state-level bonds.
None of these papers, however, identifies the exact mechanisms through which political lending
affects the real economy. By contrast, our analysis benefits from having access to matched bank-firm
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data to identify the specific channel through which real outcomes are affected. Our setup also allows
us to draw conclusions about the importance of this mechanism for aggregate investment.
We also place our results against the backdrop of a recent literature that documents a secular rise
in corporate net savings since the 1980s. Chen et al. (2017) and Dao and Maggi (2018) argue that
this increase is a global phenomenon that affects all industrialized economies. However, these studies
generally focus on large, listed firms. By contrast, Germany’s local banks predominantly lend to SMEs
and our results are therefore driven by small, non-listed firms, Germany’s famous “Mittelstand”. Ours
is the first paper to document the low investment rates of German “Mittelstand” firms and to draw
attention to their financing situation as one of its causes.
Our results also contribute to the literature on local fiscal multipliers (Nakamura and Steinsson
(2014); Adelino et al. (2017)) and, more generally, the literature on the potentially pernicious effects
of fiscal austerity (see e.g. Fetzer (2019)). It is particularly interesting to study the link between local
public finance and firm investment in the German context of the last decade because Germany was
one of the global leaders in the drive to fiscal austerity. Our results show how fiscal austerity can
backfire in unexpected ways. When credit markets are locally segmented, preferential lending of local
public banks to local governments creates an adverse effect on the real economy . In other words: if
municipalities were to finance their debt through bonds or at the national or international level, the
adverse effects on the local economy would plausibly be much smaller.
5
Last but not least, by focusing on the role of preferential lending by government-controlled banks,
our paper connects to a classic study by Song et al. (2011) which also inspires the title of our paper.
Song et al. (2011) argue that China’s persistent current account surpluses are ultimately the result
of a domestic misallocation of capital: since only politically connected (state-owned) firms can bor-
row from the banking sector, domestic private firms are required to finance investment from internal
funds. This keeps private sector investment lower than it would otherwise be. While the details of our
mechanism differ, our analysis reveals that the basic insight that current account surpluses can be the
reflection of domestic financial frictions, can usefully be applied to a developed economy. In our set-
ting it is the requirement for savings banks to lend to politically connected borrowers (municipalities)
that forces local banks to impose tighter funding conditions on unconnected borrower firms.
5
Recall that our identification exploits matched bank-firm data and a de-facto control group of firms borrowing from
other (cooperative) local banks. This allows us to effectively rule out that low firm investment is driven by a direct negative
multiplier effect of fiscal austerity on local or sector-specific demand.
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4 Data and empirical framework
4.1 Data sources
We build a data set of firm outcomes and firm-bank relationships matched with lending statistics for
the banks. To this end, we rely on two data sources, Dafne and FitchConnect.
Dafne is a data base provided by Bureau van Dijk which contains the balance sheets and income
statements for up to 1.4 million German firms based on annual reports of the companies. Dafne also
contains bank relationships for themajority of firms. Since bank relationships are overwritten in each
year, wemake use of historical volumes of the data base to obtain a panel of firm-level data. This panel
also provides us with time-varying bank-firm connections.
To proxy investment behaviour of the firm, we compute the investment rate as the difference in
fixed assets from t to t + 1 divided by fixed assets in t. We measure the effective interest rate paid
by the firm using the ratio of interest payments over last period’s bank liabilities. We compute bank
liabilities growth as the t to t + 1 change in bank liabilities divided by bank liabilities in t.
Ourmainmeasure of firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. We compute equity and cash
flow shares as the ratio of the respective variable to total assets.
We merge our firm-level data set with bank-level information from FitchConnect, a database pro-
vided by Fitch which contains historical bank balance sheets. We extract information on the net in-
terest margin, net loans, and on public sector loans. Public sector loans in the bank balance sheet
data comprise all lending to public borrowers, including the lending to public owner-operated en-
terprises and municipal enterprises without legal capacity (“Eigenbetriebe”) which are legally part of
their respective municipality but whose financial budgets are formally separate. We compute mu-
nicipal lending shares as the ratio of public sector loans to total bank assets. Data on public sector
loans in FitchConnect are available from 2009. For this reason and because our interest is in the recent,
post-crisis period of Germany’s high current-account surpluses, our empirical analysis in this paper
generally focuses on the period 2010-2016.
4.2 Public sector lending and private-sector borrowing rates
The decline of the municipal spread that we documented in Figure 4 is a particular problem for Ger-
many’s local public banks. By their statutory mandate they have to provide financing to the public
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sector. At the same time, they are generally highly dependent on local deposits and their mandate as
retail bank for the masses makes it much harder for them than for commercial banks to charge neg-
ative deposit rates, increase fees or to make cuts to their dense (and expensive) branch networks. We
argue that, over our sample period, these constraints leadGermany’s local public banks to charge their
least elastic SME customers higher interest rates than they would otherwise have done.
In the appendix, we provide a simple model inspired by Brunnermeier and Koby (2019) to formal-
ize this idea. In the model, banks have market power in local SME lending markets. As in Brunner-
meier and Koby (2019), all banks face an equity constraint. They also face a supply of deposits that
is not perfectly elastic. In addition, because of their public mandate, local public banks also have a
statutory requirement to hold a minimum fraction of their balance sheet in the form of local public
debt. We derive two main insights from this model.
First, when the statutory requirement to engage in public lending is binding, the bank will charge
its SME customers higher interest rates. As long as the banks’ supply of deposits is not perfectly elas-
tic, a binding constraint on public sector lending leads to inefficiently low provision of credit to other
customers. In order to at least partially make up for this, a profit-maximizing bank will therefore use
its market power to charge higher SME lending rates than it would do otherwise. We refer to this dif-
ferential between the constrained and the unconstrained lending rate as the break-even spread, θ. The
break-even spread captures the banks’ success at making up for the shadow cost of a binding statutory
public lending requirement and is our measure of the extent to which this requirement crowds out







where θbt > 0 is bank b’s break-even spread at time t and i
U,b
t is the lending rate that the bank would
set if it was not constrained by the statutory public lending requirement. The break-even spread θbt
reflects the shadow price on the statutory public lending constraint which stipulates that the share
of municipal lending, λbt must not fall below an exogenously given bank-specific threshold λ
b
t . In








where εD is the elasticity of deposit supply, iP is the lending rate for public sector loans (common
across all banks) and iD is the bank’s deposit rate. For notational convenience, we have suppressed the
bank and time index. Three features of equation 2 are worth highlighting.
First, equation (2) implies that, for constrained banks (forwhichλ = λ), the break-even spreadwill
be increasing inλ. Note also that an exogenous increase inλwill make itmore likely that the statutory
public lending requirement becomes binding for previously unconstrained banks. In the second part
of the paper, we argue that an exogenous increase in the fiscal burden imposed on municipalities by
state-level debt brakes increased the lower bounds λ for the local savings banks. This will allow us to
use the debt brake as an instrument for the λ of savings banks.
Secondly, as can be seen from the first term in the numerator, banks with a less elastic supply of
funds (deposits), will charge a higher break-even spread ceteris paribus. The less elastic the supply of
deposits to the bank, the costlier it is raise additional funds to satisfy the statutory lending requirement.
Hence, a less elastic balance sheet forces the bank to curtail lending to firms more. Since the bank has
market power in the SME lending market, this reduction in lending will happen through an increase
in the spread charged to SME customers. We note that the assumption that banks’ balance sheet is not
fully elastic is likely to be satisfied for Germany’s local banks (both cooperative and public) with their
heavy reliance on deposits.
6
Third, equation (2) predicts that an exogenous decline in the municipal spread iP − iD, leads to a
higher break-even spread. The intuition here is that the decline in iP − iD makes it less attractive to
invest inmunicipal loans and lowers the optimal (unconstrained) level of λ. This increases the shadow
cost on the statutory public lending requirement. It also makes it more likely that the statutory public
lending binds for previously unconstrained banks. This link between the municipal spread and the
break-even spread is an important feature of ourmodel since it can explainwhyourmechanism should
be particularly pertinent to the low-interest rate environment of the last decade, duringwhich spreads
between municipal lending rates and banks’ refinancing rates have been lower than ever before.
6
In the next subsection, we discuss how to estimate θ from data on λ and the municipal spread. In this setting the
assumption that1/εD = 0becomes easily testable for constrained banks and is rejected by the data. See also our discussion
in appendix A and the additional empirical results discussed there.
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4.3 Identifying break-even spreads in the data
Note that neither θbt nor in fact i
F,b
t is directly observable. To explore the link between public loans














+ (1− δ)iDt (3)
where λbt is again the public (municipal) debt share of a banks’ total lending and δ is the share of
deposits in the bank’s balance sheets. Furthermore, iDt and i
P
t denote the deposit rate, and the rate on
public sector lending respectively and iF,bt denotes the firm lending rate from above.
7
In our bank data set, we directly observe the bank’s net interestmargin aswell as the share of public
sector loans, λbt and the deposit share δ. To obtain an estimate of i
F,b
t , we have tomake a few additional
assumptions. First, we assume that iPt is the same for all banks and that it is given by the benchmark
rate of return on municipal bonds.
8
Secondly, for the deposit rate iDt we assume that the market for
deposits is fully integrated across regions, so that deposit interest rates equalize across banks. We use
the average deposit rate for all banks published by the Deutsche Bundesbank as our measure.
9
Based
on these assumptions, for each bank in our sample, we can then easily obtain a time-series of the firm-
lending rate iF,bt by rearranging equation (3).
Having thus obtained an estimate of iF,bt , we can use our model to identify the break-even spread
θbt . Recall from equation (2) that our model implies a non-linear relationship between the municipal
7
Strictly speaking, in this decomposition iF,bt is the average borrowing rate of all private-sector customers of the bank.
To what extent iF,bt ultimately reflects firms borrowing conditions is therefore an empirical question. As we have argued
before, SMEs are arguably the least elastic private borrowers so that we would expect them to bear the brunt of the real
impact of this spread. We therefore identify this average private-sector borrowing rate with the firm lending rate iF,bt of
the bank. To the extent that other private borrowers (such as e.g. private households) are considerably more elastic in their
credit demand, iF,bt would actually tend to underestimate the effective interest rate and the break-even spread charged to
firms.
8
While direct evidence on the borrowing conditions municipalities face is scarce, we note again that loans to munici-
palities carry a risk weight of zero and that the federal states are ultimately liable for these loans. This suggests that spreads
of individual loans to local governments over, say, German treasury bills are likely to be small and that the common com-
ponent is likely to be dominant. Some indicative evidence can be gleaned from the risk premia on municipal bonds of
major German cities that are around 25-30 basis points on average and appear rather uniform across cities (Friedrich et al.
(2014)).
9
Electronic banking hasmade itmuch easier for households to arbitrage small differences in deposit rates. Also, there is
empirical evidence that banks’ pricing power in deposit markets shrinks as interest rates decline towards zero, as has been
the case for most of our sample period Hainz et al. (2017). At a more general level, we would expect that any heterogeneity
in deposit rates in the data would be dwarfed by the heterogeneity in firm lending rates simply because the Germanmarket
for deposits is much less segmented along geographical lines than the market for SME lending.
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lending share λ and the firm-lending rate. Defining Λbt =
1
1−λbt
and plugging (2) into (1), we can
estimate the relationship from the following panel regression
iF,bt = a×Λ
b
t + b×Λbt ×Municipal Spreadt︸                                              ︷︷                                              ︸
θbt
+time+ region + bank controls︸                                      ︷︷                                      ︸
iU,bt
(4)
which we run separately for the sample of Sparkassen and Volksbanken. This regression is our direct
empirical counterpart to the decomposition (1) and to equation (2) above. Note that the first two
terms on the right hand side capture the dependence of iF,bt on the public lending share and on the
declining spread of municipal borrowing rates over deposit rates and can therefore be associated with
the break-even spread, θbt . The remaining terms on the right hand side capture time, regional and
bank-level variation in firm lending rates.
The results are presented in Table 2. Both coefficients a and b are significant only for the savings
banks, not for cooperative banks. This is consistent with the prediction from our model, that a sig-
nificant link between municipal lending and the firm-lending rate should only be present for banks
that actually face a statutory lending constraint and for which it is binding. Also consistent with our
model, the coefficient a is positive , whileb is negative. In fact, we cannot reject thatb is negative unity,
the value predicted by our model. As public sector borrowing rates have declined, the shadow cost of
a given level of public sector debt for constrained banks has increased, leading to higher borrowing
rates for firm customers.
10
4.4 Constructing firm-level exposures: the local public bank spread
We now construct firm-level exposures to the funding conditions set by local public banks. As we
have shown in the previous subsection, differences in firm lending rates across banks and regions are
related to the extent of the banks’ municipal lending and to the general decline in the spread of public
sector loans over the bank’s refinancing rate. We therefore use estimates of regression (4) for the local
10
According to equation (2), for constrained banks the estimate of a corresponds to the inverse of the elasticity of banks’
deposit supply, 1/εD . Our estimates of a > 1 therefore imply that savings banks have a funding supply elasticity below
one. We can therefore safely reject that savings banks operate in perfectly competitive funding markets. See appendix A
for further discussion and empirical results.
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public banks to back out an empirical estimate of the break-even spread, θ̂bt , as the fitted value
θ̂bt = â×Λbt + b̂×Λbt ×Municipal Spreadt (5)
where â and b̂ are the estimates of the respective coefficients in regression (4).
In a next step, we then combine the break-even spreads charged by local public banks with infor-
mation on firms’ bank relations to construct the average break-even spread that a firm is exposed to
because it is connected to local public banks. For firm f in year t we define this exposure to spreads









t × 1b=Local public bank (6)
where Bt( f ) is the set of all local banks with which firm f maintains a lending relationship in year
t, ω f ,bt is the weight of the relation with bank b and 1b=Local public bank is an indicator variable for
whether bank b is a local public bank. We refer to SPK as local public bank spread.
We make two remarks concerning the construction of SPK. First, our data set does not contain
direct information about the amount of loans that a firm borrows from each bank. Also, even if this
information was available, the actual extent to which each firm borrows from a bank could be en-
dogenous to firm- or bank-level characteristics. Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Degryse and Ongena
(2005) have shown that distance to the lending bank and the competitors is a key determinant of the
lending conditions faced by SMEs. We therefore impute the weights ω
f ,b
t based on the inverse of the










This weighting reflects the notion that distance is a key determinant of the intensity of a bank relation,
in particular when lending is relationship-based, as is the case for Germany’s SMEs.
Second, we note that an implicit assumption in constructing SPK is that cooperative and other
banks do not charge a local public bank spread. This assumption is empirically justified by the re-
sults in Table 2 and reflects the different institutional constraints faced by local public and cooperative
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banks.In our empirical analysis below, we generate a placebo treatment by assigning non-zero val-
ues for θ̂bt to cooperative and other banks based on the procedure above. None of our main results
holds under this placebo treatment, providing further evidence that our mechanism is driven by the
institutional features of local public banks.
4.5 Firm-level regressions: estimation and identification
We conjecture that higher levels of the local public bank spread lead firms to invest less. However,
consistent with the literature on the firm-borrowing channel (Khwaja and Mian (2008)), the impact
of SPK on firm-level outcomes should also depend on the firm’s ability to tap alternative sources of
finance. Our baseline specification therefore becomes
INV
f
t = α× SPK
f
t + β× η
f × SPK ft + β





where the dependent variable INV
f
t is the investment rate of firm f in year t and η
f
is a genericmeasure
of the firm’s ability to substitute credit from local public banks with other funds, such as firm size, the
availability of internal funds, firm age or the number of bank relationships. We therefore refer to η as
the firm’s substitution elasticity with respect to local public bank credit.
The vector X ft contains time-varying firm-specific controls and the vector δ
f
t collects a range
of fixed effects, including firm fixed effects, municipality-time and sector-time effects. Since η will
generally be time-invariant in our specifications, its stand-alone term will be absorbed by firm effects
and is therefore not included above.
Themarginal effect of SPK on investment (or other firm-level outcomes) is then given by α + β×
η, where we would expect that α < 0 and β > 0: the real impact of a higher local public bank spread
is dampened for firms with a higher substitution elasticity. In our analysis below, we will generally
measure η as deviation from the median value of the substitution elasticity for a reference group of
firms (e.g. a sector). This normalization allows us to interpret α as an average treatment effect of SPK
on firm-level investment in the respective reference group.
There are a number of reasons that underpin this causal interpretation. First, our use of matched
bank-firm data effectively allows us to rule out a lot of factors that could confound our estimate of
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α. Specifically, the break-even spreads used to compute SPK are constructed using bank’s balance
sheet info about public lending and aggregate info on the municipal spread only, while controlling
for local and time variation in market interest rates and bank characteristics. Hence, SPK is clearly
uncorrelatedwith omitted time-varyingfirm-specific factors such as variation in the firm’s demand for
loans or a firm’s riskiness. Second, SPK exploits variation across firms in the same location in terms of
their banking relations. This makes SPK uncorrelated with common, region-specific influences that
affect all firms in the same location.
Our approach also takes account of potential threats to identification that could arise if specific
firms match with specific banks. For example, it is well known that savings banks specialize in re-
lationship lending to small and medium sized firms. If these firms happen to have lower investment
rates, e.g. because they are less productive or subject to higher levels of idiosyncratic risk, this could
bias the estimate of α towards the negative. We can effectively alleviate this concern because the com-
position of the customer base and the business model of local cooperative banks are very similar to
that of savings banks and many small firms are customers of both types of banks. Since only the sav-
ings banks customers get exposed to the break-even spreads, the estimate of α is therefore unaffected
by sorting of small firms to specific local banks.
5 Firm-Level Results
5.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides summary statistics for themain variables in our data set. The average of the local bank
spread across all firm-year observations in our sample is 71 basis points. The variation across firms
is also considerable. The standard deviation of SPK is 86 basis points. The average investment rate
(as a fraction of assets) for the firm in our sample is around 15 percent, while the average interest rate
firms pay on their liabilities is around 3 percent. Interest rates vary widely across firms, the standard
deviation of interest rates paid by firms is of the samemagnitude as the mean. Average bank liabilities
growth across our sample of firms is around 1 percent per year, againwithwide variation. The average
firm has around 420000 = 1000 ∗ exp(6.04) EUR in assets and has a cash flow of 9 percent of total
assets.
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5.2 Firm-level: baseline results
As our baseline measure of the substitution elasticity η f in the firm-level regression (8) we choose
firm size as measured by the log of firms’ total assets. We take the value in the first year of our sample
(2010) and subtract the sector-median firm size in that year. This normalization ensures that the stand-
alone coefficient α measures the marginal impact of SPK on the median firm in the firm’s respective
sector which facilitates the interpretation of our quantitative results. We estimate (8) using OLS and
clustering standard errors at the municipal (county) level. Table 3 presents the results .
Column (1) shows a plain specification with time and firm fixed effects. Our estimate of the co-
efficient on SPK, α , is negative and significant. Conversely, the coefficient on the interaction term
SPK × η is significantly positive, in line with our conjecture that bigger firms can more easily sub-
stitute loans from local public banks with other sources of finance and are therefore less exposed to
SPK.
In column (2), we add firm size and the equity share as firm-specific controls. We refer to these
variables as the baseline controls as we will use them in most specifications throughout the rest of the
paper.
11
Adding firm-level controls hardly affects the estimate of α.
Low firm-level investment could be the results of some regions or sectors being in relative decline
or being exposed to specific adverse shocks. If, for some reason, local public banks are particularly
active in these declining regions or if they lend primarily to certain sectors, this could lead to a cor-
relation between these firm’s investment rates an SPK that could bias our estimates of α downward.
To rule out that our results are confounded by such regional or sector-specific factors, we include
municipality-time effects in column (3) and also add sector-specific time effects in column (4). This
decreases our estimate of α to around−0.8 but the coefficient stays highly significant. In column (5)
we further tighten our specification, by including county-sector-time dummies. This effectively al-
lows sectoral factors to load differentially on different regions and also controls for heterogeneous
effects of regional factors across sectors. The estimate of α remains stable and significantly negative.
We consider the specification in column (5) with our baseline set of firm-level controls and with firm-
11
With these controls, derived from firm-balance sheets, our data set comprises roughly 1.8 mio observations. In the
appendix we report results with an extended set of controls including e.g. revenue growth and cash flow that are derived
from income statements. None of our main results is sensitive to this choice. However, the majority of firms in our data
set only consistently report balance sheet items and not the income statements. Hence, including variables derived from
income statements in the regression, considerably lowers the number of observations.
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level and county-sector-time fixed effects as our benchmark for firm-level regressions in the rest of
the paper.
In Table 4, we provide estimates of this benchmark specification for three alternative measures of
the substitution elasticity η f : (log) firm employment, firm age and the number of bank relationships of
the firm. In column (1), for convenience, we also reproduce the baseline specification from column (4)
of the previous table. Table 4 reveals the same pattern we have documented before. The coefficient α
is negative and significant throughout and a higher ability to substitute funds lowers the impact of the
local public bank spread on firm-level investment. Our estimates of α vary somewhat across different
specifications in Table 4 since by varying the concept of η we effectively normalize the stand-alone
coefficient α to measure the marginal impact of SPK at very different points of the firm distribution.
It is instructive to gauge the economic significance of our estimates of α and to evaluate the impact
of SPK on firm-level investment implied by the different specifications in Table 4.
Consider first from our benchmark specification in column (1) (or, equivalently, column (5) of
Table 3). The value of α of -0.88 means that a one-standard deviation increase in the local bank spread
of around 85 basis pointswill lower the investment rate for themedian firmby around 0.75 percentage
points. With an average investment rate of 15 percent of fixed assets across all firms, this amounts to
a 5 percent (0.0075/0.15) decrease in firm-level investment.
At the other end of the spectrum of estimates of α, consider the specification where η is measured
by firm employment in column (2). Here, the value of −3.48 implies that a one standard deviation
increase in SPK lowers investment by almost 3 percentage points or 2 percent of the usual level of
investment of the average firm.
Hence, the results in Table 4 show that firms invest considerably less in response to increases in
their local bank spread. Since the local public bank spread ultimately reflects the shadow costs of
municipal debt holdings across savings banks, our results suggest that local public debt crowds out
private investment in Germany’s locally segmented credit markets to a considerable extent.
To appreciate themagnitude of the sensitivity of investment to local public bank spreads, we relate
our estimates to earlier studies in the literature.
Consistent with Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2007) and Guiso et al. (2002) we find that investment is
highly sensitive to truly exogenous measures of firm interest rates.
12
Our most conservative baseline
12
The early literature in this area based onmacro or sectoral time series evidence generally found it difficult to establish
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estimate for α implies that a 100 basis point increase in the interest rate lowers investment by 90 basis
point. This is only slightly higher than the 75 basis points reduction found by Gilchrist and Zakrajsek
(2007).
While of the same order of magnitude, the sensitivities implied by the other specifications in Ta-
ble 4 are 2-3 times higher. To understand this discrepancy, note that Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2007)’s
estimates are based on a sample of big, listed and bond-issuing firms from the period before the finan-
cial crisis. We would expect that the smaller and more opaque firms that dominate in our sample are
considerably more sensitive to changes in financing conditions. Furthermore, as recently highlighted
by Lin et al. (2018), the secular drop in interest rates since the financial crisis and the commitment of
monetary policymakers to keep rates low for long will considerably increase the sensitivity of invest-
ment to small changes in interest rates. Against this backdrop, it may not appear surprising that the
estimates by Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2007) should provide a lower bound on our estimates here.
The finding that small spreads have a relatively bigger impact on SME investment in a low-for-
long environment clearly also has potential implications for the transmission of monetary policy. If
average borrowing rates are low, then relatively small frictions in the financial systemmay have a dis-
proportionate effect on firm-level investment. This can frustrate attempts by the monetary authority
to stimulate the economy with low or negative interest rates.
5.3 Transmission mechanism
Our theory would predict that higher local public bank spreads lead to a deterioration of credit terms
and to reduced lending to customer firms. Table 5 provides evidence to this effect.
Here we run our baseline regression, however now with the growth rate of firms’ bank liability
(column (1)) and the average interest rate firms pay on their loans (column (2)) as the dependent vari-
ables. Higher exposure to SPK does indeed lower firms’ bank borrowing. The estimated coefficient on
SPK in column (1) implies that a 100 basis points increase in the local bank spread would lower firms’
bank borrowing by about 7 percent. The results in column (2) suggest that the average interest rate
that firms pay on their outstanding bank liabilities increases by around 25 bps after a 100 bps increase
in SPK.
a significant link between interest rates and investment. As discussed by Guiso et al. (2002), studies based on firm-level
evidence that use truly exogenous shifters in firm’s cost of capital (such as e.g. tax reforms or indicators of firm-level
interest rates constructed using bank-level information, as we do here) tend to find much larger effects.
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Crowding out of private investment should only be possible in segmented credit markets where
the savings banks have sufficiently high market power. If firms can easily switch away from the sav-
ings banks, then variation in SPK should have no bearing on real outcomes. Table 6 illustrates that the
local segmentation of Germany’s credit market is indeed an important ingredient of our mechanism.
The table reports results for investment, bank liability growth and the average interest rates paid by
firms on two sub-samples: one for firms head-quartered in counties where savings banks account for
a high (above-median) share of all bank-firm relationships (high segmentation) and one for firms head-
quartered in counties with a low share of savings banks in firm-bank relations (low segmentation). In
the investment regression, our estimate of α in the high-segmentation counties (columns (1)) is sig-
nificant and much higher than when estimated with the same controls on the whole sample (compare
column (4) of Table 3). Conversely, the coefficient is much lower and insignificant when estimated
on the low-segmentation sample (column (2)). The same pattern holds for the bank-liability growth
and interest rate regressions. SPK has a much stronger bearing on firm-level outcomes in the high-
segmentation counties (columns (3) and (5)) than in the low-segmentation counties (columns (4) and
(6)).
To further illustrate the particular role that the local public banks play for our results, we repeat our
analysis on a placebo sample. To this end, we construct a break-even spread for the local cooperative
banks using the bank-level regression in column 3 of Table 2 while setting the break-even spreads
for the savings banks to zero. We then re-construct SPK using this set of break-even spreads and
re-estimate the previous firm-level regressions. The results are in Tables B.1 in the appendix. As is
apparent, the local public bank spread SPK is insignificant for investment but also for the two variables
that should play a central role for submission: firms’ bank liability growth and the average interest rate
they pay.
5.4 Granular IV estimation
An important assumption underlying our identification strategy is that local public banks’ break-even
spread are exogenous with respect to firms’ investment decisions after controlling for our rich set of
time-varying sector and regional effects.
In this subsection we probe this assumption empirically. Specifically, our identification strategy
would be threatened if certain firms select to savings banks based on someunobserved or uncontrolled
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firm-specific characteristics and if the local public bank spread is affected by these characteristics. For
example, this could be the case if local savings banks are charging a higher interest ratewhen lending to
particularly risky firms in certain sectors that other banks do not want to lend to. The number of such
firms might be particularly high in distressed areas with high public debt levels (and therefore high
municipal lending shares). In this setting higher local public bank spreads would arise because firms
connected to savings banks are risky and not because the statutory public lending requirement im-
poses a shadow cost on the bank. In the samemould, it could be thatmunicipal lending and high public
expenditures of local government affect demand of savings-bank dependent firmsmore strongly than
their peers connected to local cooperative banks. This could lead them to demandmore loans, leading
to higher local public bank spreads. In both cases, we would then have a reverse causality between
firms’ investment and public banks’ break-even spreads.
Making this point more formally, assume that our measurement of banks’ break-even spreads is
correlated with an unobserved vector of factors Ft, so that
θ̂bt = φ
b
t ′Ft + ζbt (9)
where φbt is a vector of bank-specific loadings on Ft and ζ
b
t is the ‘true‘ break-even spread that is
uncorrelated with Ft.
If Ft is for some reason correlated with firm investment, then the estimated residual of the invest-





′Ft for some vector of firm-specific loadings γ
f
t and our OLS
estimate of α would be biased.
To check to what extent our OLS results are affected by such confounders, we propose to adapt
the granular instrumental variable (GIV) approachpioneered byGabaix andKoijen (2020). Specifically,
assume for a moment that we had estimates of the factors Ft and the loadings φbt . Then we can obtain












where Bt( f ) is again the set of banks with which firm f maintains relations and ω
f ,b
t is our set of
distance weights from 6 above. GIV
f
t would be a valid instrument for SPK because ζ̂
b
t is correlated
with SPK via θ̂bt while being uncorrelated with the vector of confounders Ft by construction.
Estimation of the confounding factors Ft could be done jointly with the loadings φbt using some
factor-analytical technique. Alternatively, we could use some economic theory to parametrize the
loadings in terms of economic observables. This is the approach we follow here. In particular, we
make use of of the structure of our data set and interpret φbt as the vector of sectoral portfolio weights
of bank b. While our data set does not contain the actual amount bank b lends to each firm, it allows us
to compute the number of firms connected to each bank and also the share of each sector in the banks’
firm relationships. In this way, we obtain a time-varying sequence of sectoral proxy portfolio weights
for each bank which we take as our loadings φbt . Once the loadings φ
b
t , are known, the factors Ft in
(9) can now easily be estimated by running a cross-sectional regression of the break-even spreads on
the banks’ portfolio shares for each year.
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To obtain an optimal, precision-weighted instrument in
the sense of Gabaix and Koijen (2020), we estimate (9) using weighted least squares with the weights




t using the residual of this
regression as our measure of ζ̂bt .
In Table 7 we report results using GIV and its interaction with η as instruments for SPK and its
interaction with η. Our earlier conclusions prevail: firms exposed to higher break-even spreads have
significantly lower investment and bank liability growth, and the effect on interest rates is significantly
positive. The first-stage regressions (for SPK and its interaction with η respectively) are both highly
significant. Since we have more than one endogenous variable, we also have to check that the instru-
ments span the space of the endogenous regressors, i.e. that they are linearly independent. To this end,
we use the Sanderson andWindmeijer (2016) conditional F-statistics and bootstrap its p-values using
1000 replications. These signal that the instruments (GIV and its interactionwith η) are indeed linearly
independent. Turning to the quantitative economic interpretation of the IV estimates, we note that
13
To keep the number of factors manageable, we limit ourselves to the sectors which on average have the highest shares
in the portfolios of local banks: manufacturing (NACE-1 code C), construction (F), commerce (G), and technical and pro-
fessional services (M).
14
Gabaix and Koijen (2020) show that it is efficient to weight the granular residuals ζ̂bt with the inverse of their volatility.
However, our sample is relatively short, so that estimates of the volatility of ζ̂bt for individual banks are likely to be very
noisy. We therefore take guidance from our economic theory: equation (2) states that banks’ break even-spread should
be more sensitive to exogenous fluctuations in the municipal spread if they have higher values of Λ, implying that these
banks should have more volatile θ̂bt .
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the point estimates of α in all three regressions are very similar to those obtained in our corresponding
OLS specifications in column (5) of Table 3 and in Table 5. While the coefficients are a generally a bit
bigger (in absolute value) than the OLS estimates, we have to bear in mind that the standard deviation
of the first-stage fitted value of at around 75 basis points is also slightly lower than that of SPK itself
(85 basis points). Hence, our previous conclusions that a one-standard deviation increase in SPK low-
ers investment by around 5 percent, bank liabilities by around 7 percent and increases firms average
interest payments by around 30 basis points remain virtually unaltered.
6 The role of fiscal austerity
Our results show that banks with higher public debt shares charge higher interest rates to their pri-
vate borrowers and that this crowds out private investment in Germany’s locally segmented banking
markets. Against the background of Germany’s recent fiscal consolidation over the last decade, this
finding may appear surprising, at first. In this section, we provide evidence that fiscal austerity at the
state and federal levels and the financing of public debt by local banks are two sides of the same coin.
Starting in 2009, the federal government andmost federal states incorporated so-calleddebt brakes
into the federal and state constitutions. These debt brakes stipulate that the federal government and
the states may not incur new debt by 2016 and 2020, respectively. While some allowances are made
for recessionary periods, the debt brakes limit the federal government to 0.35 percent of GDP and that
of the states to zero in normal times.
We argue that the debt brake legislation generated exogenous variation in fiscal consolidation
needs at the state-level that then impacted municipalities differentially depending on their specific
fiscal situation at the time the debt brake came into being (2010). We exploit this variation to instru-
ment themunicipal lending share in our bank-level regressions. This allows us to answer the question
what fraction of the crowding-out that we have documented in the data can be accounted for by fiscal
consolidation.
As discussed before, the debt brake has encouraged state- and federal governments to shift expen-
sive government tasks to the municipalities.
15
15
Germany’s parliamentary system puts considerable emphasis on finding a balance of power and compromise between
the states and the federal government. However, while the federal and state-levels of government have direct parliamentary
representation in the Bundestag (the lower chamber) and the Bundesrat (the upper chamber) respectively, municipalities as
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Importantly, the constitutional debt brakes do not generally cover the debt of the municipalities.
However, already prior to the introduction of the debt brake, the debt levels of many municipalities
were so high that their ability to take on new expensive government tasks, let alone to generate new
public investment, was severely impaired. We argue that fiscal consolidation needs at the state level
directly impactedmunicipalities and led to increased public debt shares on local bank balance sheets.
16
Since municipalities have only very limited taxation powers, they had to fill the funding gaps
through increased borrowing. Due to their statutory public lending requirement, we would expect
this increased municipal credit demand to lead to increased municipal lending by savings banks, par-
ticularly inmunicipalitieswhere therewas high public debt to beginwith. Tomake this point formally,
we construct a measure of fiscal consolidation needs (‘fiscal pressure‘) at the state level as follows:
FP
s
t = −min (Deficitst − Consolidation pathst ,0) (11)
where s indexes the federal state, Deficitst is the state’s public deficit relative to GDP and the term
Consolidation Path denotes the projected structural deficit for state s in year t as stipulated by the
debt brake. Introduced in 2010, the debt break requires that states close their structural deficits to
zero by 2020. The projected consolidation path therefore assumes that a state’s 2010 deficit is reduced
linearly until 2020. We then run the following bank-level regression for the period 2010-2016 on our
sample of all local banks (cooperative and public):
λbt =γ× LocalPublicDebtc2010(b) + δ× LocalPublicDebtc2010(b)× FP
s(b)
t
+ φ1b × LocalPublicDebtc2010(b) + ρ1b × LocalPublicDebtc2010(b)× FP
s(b)
t
+ ψ1b × FP
s(b)






where λbt is again the public debt share on local bank b’s balance sheet, FP
s(b)
t is the pressure for fiscal
consolidation in state s(b) in which bank b is located and LocalPublicDebtc2010(b) is the ratio of
the lowest levels of government, have no such representation. This is what makes this burden-shifting politically possible
in the first place.
16
In line with our findings here, Fratzscher, Kriwolutzky and Michelsen discuss in Fuest et al. (2019) that higher levels
of government increasingly passed legislation that shifted considerable financial burdens onto the municipalities. They
cite social security payments, notably the cost of accommodation of households on social benefits or payments to asylum
seekers as examples. In return, municipalities obtained a share of the tax revenue that federal states and the federal gov-
ernment raise, but these funds were generally insufficient to cover the additional expense imposed on municipalities by
new legislation.
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outstanding local public debt to localGDP inmunicipality (county) c(b), at the beginning of the sample
period (2010) and 1b is an indicator dummy that is one if bank b is a savings bank. Controls contains
bank controls as well as state- and time fixed effects.
Regression (12) examines the linkbetweenbanks’municipal lending share and local fiscal pressures
for all local banks. It is effectively a diff-in-diff specification where the local cooperative banks are the
control group. Estimation results are presented in Table 8. First, note that higher local public debt
increases municipal lending for all local banks (γ > 0) but more so for savings banks (φ > 0). Also,
savings banks generally have a higher share of local public debt on their books (κ > 0). Importantly,
only the savings banks react to pressures on local public finances by lending more to municipalities:
We find ρ > 0 , while the corresponding coefficient for the local cooperative banks is negative (δ < 0).
This suggests that cooperative banks become more cautious in their lending to local municipalities as
fiscal pressures increase.
As a last exercise, we ask to what extent the impact of the debt brake on local public finances in
Germany can explain the crowding out of private investment that we documented in our firm-level
data. To this end, we take guidance from the results of regression (12) and generate a measure of the
extent towhich state-level consolidationneedsweigh on local public finances. We refer to thismeasure
as LFP
b


















MunicipalSpread in the interest-rate regression (4) from above. These IV results are inTable 9. In line
with our conjecture, local fiscal pressure is significantly correlated withmunicipal lending shares only
for the savings banks, leading to strong first stages in the IV-regression, with both F-statistics exceed-
ing 10. Also, the instruments have sufficient linearly independent variation as indicated by the high
values of the conditional F-statistics proposed by Sanderson andWindmeijer (2016). By contrast, local
fiscal pressure has almost no traction as an instrument for the municipal lending of the cooperative
banks.
Turning to the second-stage estimates, we find them to be in linewith those previously reported in
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Table 2 for the OLS regression. For the savings banks, the coefficient on Λbt is positive and bigger than
one (though not quite significant in the second stage) while the coefficient on the interaction of Λbt
with the municipal spread is significantly negative, around -1, as suggested by the theory. Conversely,
the estimates for the cooperative banks are small and insignificant again.
In a next step, we use our estimates of the bank-level IV regression in Table 9 to generate the break-
even spreads according to equation (5). We then recalculate SPK with the resulting austerity-induced
spreads, that we abbreviate with θ̂A,bt , thus obtaining a measure of the austerity induced component
of the local public bank spread (to which we refer with SPK
A, f
t ). For easier comparison with our
earlier findings, we rescale this "fiscal austerity induced" SPKA to the same standard deviation as our
baseline SPK. We then re-run our previous firm-level regressions using this austerity-induced local
public banks spread. The results are in Table 10. The first column is for investment, the second and
third columns show results for the key transmission variables, bank liability growth and the average
interest rate firms pay.
Table 10 clearly confirms our previous findings. The local bank shock has a significantly negative
effect on investment and firms’ borrowing and increases the average interest rate paid. Regarding the
magnitude of the coefficient on the investment equation, it is roughly 70 percent of the size of the
estimate in our baseline specification in column 4 of Table 3. This suggests that fiscal austerity over
our sample period quantitatively explains between two thirds and three quarters of the crowding out
effect induced by local public bank spreads.
7 Extensions and robustness
7.1 Implications for aggregate investment
In this section, we gauge the importance of our crowding-out mechanism for Germany’s aggregate
investment. Our aim is to provide a conservative estimate of the aggregate investment loss. To this
end, we re-estimate ourmain specification from column (5) in Table 3 subtract the initial (2010) sector-
regional mean from SPK. In this way we take ex ante sector- and region-specific differences across
firms in their exposure to the local public bank spread as given, counting only firm-specific dynamics
in SPK over our sample period as contributing to our mechanism. We then aggregate the partial fitted
value α× SPK+ β× η× SPK across all firms in our sample, weighting each firm with is total fixed
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assets to obtain a measure of crowding out in our sample. We call this aggregate the predicted loss and
subtract this loss from the aggregate gross investment that we obtain from firms in our Dafne sample.
In this way, we obtain the counterfactual investment path that would have obtained in our sample in
the absence of crowding-out.
Based on these in-sample calculations, we then extrapolate the effect on Germany’s official aggre-
gate investment data, by multiplying official investment with the ratio of the counterfactual to ag-
gregate gross investment from our sample, thus obtaining a counterfactual investment path for ag-
gregate German investment.
17
Figure 6 presents time series for this counterfactual investment path
along with the official investment data from the federal statistical office. Without crowding-out, ag-
gregate investment in Germany over 2010-2016 could have been around 7 percent higher, amounting
to around 35 billion Euros or roughly 1 percent of GDP per year. The gap is between actual and coun-
terfactual investment bottoms out in the year 2012 with around 1.5 percent of aggregate investment
or 8.5 billion Euro and rises to around 32 billion or 6 percent of aggregate investment by the end of
the sample period. Notably, the increase after 2012 is quite consistent with ourmechanism since 2012
is the year in which the ECB started quantitative easing and in which the spread between municipal
borrowing and banks’ refinancing rates – a key driver of our mechanism reached zero for the first
time in our sample (compare Figure 4). Note that our simple calculations here cannot take account of
any multiplier effects that low private investment by treated firms may have in general equilibrium.
However, to the extent that there are likely to be positive spillovers from treated firms’ investment to
the output and investment of non-treated firms and to local public finances, it is legitimate to speculate
that our estimates could well constitute a lower bound of the aggregate effects of our mechanism.
18
7.2 Additional robustness checks
Extended set of controls
We also report results with an extended set of firm-level controls. See Table B.2 and B.3. In these re-
gressions we include cash flow and revenue growth along with our baseline controls, i.e. firm size and
17
This effectively assumes that our data base is sufficiently representative of Germany’s economy as a whole. Indeed,
investment of firms in theDafne database accounts for roughly 50 percent of Germany’s gross private investment over our
sample period. The investment of firms in our regression sample (i.e. for which we have the full set of included covariates,
in particular SPK) in turn accounts for roughly 70-80 percent of aggregate investment in Dafne.
18
We thank Gianluca Violante and Thomas Drechsel for independently suggesting this point.
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the equity share. This substantial reduces our sample size since income statements are not reported
for most firms in our sample. Still, our results remain qualitatively the same.
East-West Germany sample split
Local banks have a different history in the western and eastern parts of Germany. In the 19th century,
local banks were founded mainly in the west and the south of the country. During the communist
era in East Germany, only big, state-run banks existed that were eventually dissolved following the
reunification of the country in 1990. While the big West German banks started to enter the market in
the east by opening new branches, local banks in East Germany essentially had to be founded anew in
the years after reunification. To make sure that our results are not driven by some East-West divide,
we also run our baseline regressions by splitting the sample into East and West. The results in Table
B.4 show that our mechanism is not driven by some unobserved West-East divide. However, it is
interesting to observe that the results are, if anything, qualitatively stronger in East Germany. This
is consistent with the fact that East German firms are generally smaller than West-German ones (e.g.
none of the big companies listed in the large-cap stock market index DAX is headquartered in East-
Germany).
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that two key characteristics of Germany’s banking system—local seg-
mentation and the role of local public banks in local government finance—have contributed to the
crowding out of private investment over the last decade. Our paper is the first to provide evidence of
such local crowding out for a developed economy. It is also the first paper to provide detailed evidence
that such crowding out happens through the balance sheet of local public banks.
Local banks dominate the market for SME lending in most of the country, contributing to sig-
nificant local segmentation of credit markets for small corporate borrowers. Our analysis exploits
Germany’s unique institutional setting in which there are two types of local banks: local cooperative
and local public banks. While both types of banks are similar in terms of their customer base of small
and medium sized businesses and generally present in the same local market, local public banks also
have a statutory requirement to lend to the local public sector while the cooperative banks do not.
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We argue that this statutory lending requirement is an important driver of the crowding out of
private investment. We use a simple theoretical model to show that, as long as banks face some con-
straint on lengthening their balance sheet in response to public sector credit demand – which is the
case for most local banks which are highly deposit-dependent—the statutory lending requirement
will impose a shadow cost on banks’ balance sheet. This shadow cost materializes as a spread on their
lending rates to private customers, to which the least elastic private customers, SMEs, are also most
strongly exposed. We document this mechanism empirically using matched bank-firm data covering
1.2 mio German firms. Local public banks with higher levels of public lending charge their SME cus-
tomers higher interest rates on average. This local public bank spread reduces the investment rate of
these firms by an economically important margin. For the average firm, increasing the local public
bank spread by 100 basis points will lower investment by around 5 percent. We estimate that aggre-
gate investment in Germany would have been around 30-35 bio Euro per year (or roughly 1 percent
of GDP) higher without this mechanism.
Our mechanism can also explain why crowding out of private investment can take place against
the backdrop of secularly low interest rates and in a country where public finances have seen a secular
consolidation over the last decade.
In fact, our theory and empirical results show that ourmechanism is strengthened in a low-interest
rate environment. The reason is that declining intermediation spreads on local public sector lending
have made it less and less attractive for banks to engage in this type of business. However, unlike
other banks, local public banks still have to fulfill their statutory public lending requirement. Hence,
decreasing intermediation spreads on municipal lending have increased the shadow cost of this re-
quirement over time, leading them to increase the spreads they charge SME customers. This has led
tomore crowding out. Our findings here therefore also identify a new channel throughwhich quanti-
tative easing andmonetary policy with low-for-long interest rates can backfire by eventually reducing
the lending to the private sector.
Over the last decade, Germany’s federal states and the federal government have tightened their
spending under the influence of the so-called debt brake. Against this backdrop of fiscal austerity, it
may appear surprising thatwefind any evidence of crowding out inGermany at all. However, we argue
that fiscal austerity at the state- and federal levels and the financial distress of manymunicipalities are
actually two sides of the same coin. In the process of fiscal consolidation stipulated by the debt brake,
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the federal and state governments have shiftedmany expensive government tasks to themunicipalities,
whose debt is explicitly exempted from the debt brake. Since municipalities’ ability to raise taxes is
very limited, their fiscal situation worsened. We use the exogenous consolidation needs of state-level
budgets stipulated by the debt brake to gauge the fiscal pressure that states pass onto municipalities
and to instrument local public banks’ municipal lending shares. Repeating our firm-level analysis, we
show that up to three quarters of the crowding out we observe over our sample period could be driven
by fiscal austerity.
Our findings therefore also uncover a new channel through which fiscal austerity can have con-
tractionary effects. Fiscal consolidation does not only have direct consequences in terms of lower
public investment. Rather, our results show that in imperfect financial and banking markets, the un-
intended impact on private investment can be of a similar order or magnitude as the effect on public
investment. We believe that these results could hold lessons for many other countries in which banks
with an explicit mandate for public lending are a feature of the banking landscape and where credit
markets are segmented along regional lines.
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Figure 1: Sectoral Decomposition of Germany’s Net Lending
Note: The figure plots Germany’s current account balance and its sectoral composition in terms of the
ration of net lending to GDP.
Figure 2: Map of local bank dependence
Note: This figure shows the dependence of firms on local banks in German counties in 2009. The
dependence is computed as the share of savings and cooperative bank connections in the total number
of bank connections in a county.
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Savings Bank Cooperative Bank
Source: FitchConnect and Destatis
Note: Each dot represents a local bank in Germany. The y-axis indicates the share of public loans in
total loans taken from the bank’s balance sheet in 2010. The x-axis denotes the debt to GDP ratio of
the county, in which the bank is based, also in 2010.















Avg. Yield on Public Bonds Avg. Deposit Rate
Source: Bundesbank
Note: This figure compares the average yield on public bonds (“Umlaufrendite”)with the average short-
term deposit rate for private households.
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Note: Each dot represents a local bank in Germany, red for savings banks, blue for cooperative banks.
The y-axis indicates the firm lending rate which is imputed based on the identity in equation (3). The
x-axis denotes the public loans share from the bank balance sheet in the respective year. Red (blue)
lines indicate the regression line for the savings and cooperative bank sub-samples respectively.





























Note: The figure shows the time official times series for Germany’s aggregate gross investment from
the federal office of statistics (red, solid line) and the counterfactual aggregate investment series (blue,
dashed line) implied by the absence of crowding out. See subsection 7.1 for details.
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Main Variables
Statistic N Mean St. Dev.
Local Public Bank Spread 5,600,816 0.0071 0.0086
Investment Rate 2,470,268 0.1511 0.8417
Interest Rate 233,433 0.1075 0.1147
Bank Liabilities Growth 269,471 0.1664 0.9778
Cashflow Share 550,543 0.0944 0.1483
Firm Size 4,167,569 6.0420 1.9451
Sales Growth 847,770 0.0729 0.2830
Equity Ratio 4,084,037 0.4036 0.3360
Employment 2,165,117 28.2831 63.1735
Age 9,124,290 17.7486 19.6768
Note: The table shows the numbers of observation, the mean and the standard
deviation of the main variables and controls. Data are annual, sample period is
2010-2016.
Table 2: Firm lending rates and municipal lending shares
Dependent variable: Firm Interest Rate
savings banks cooperative banks
Λ 1.866∗∗∗ 1.734∗∗∗ −1.278 −1.203
(0.377) (0.482) (0.993) (1.003)
Λ×Municipal Spread −0.838∗∗∗ −0.620∗∗ −0.502 0.187
(0.203) (0.293) (0.767) (0.813)




County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE County County County County
Observations 2,849 6,603 1,960 4,883
R
2
0.901 0.792 0.906 0.791
Note: The table shows the results from the bank-level panel regressions run sepa-
rately for the sample of Sparkassen (columns 1 and 2) and Volksbanken (columns
3 and 4)
iF,bt = a×Λbt + b×Λbt ×Municipal Spreadt + β′Xbt + δbt + ubt
where iF,bt and Λ
b
t are the average firm lending rate and the public (munic-
ipal) debt share of a banks’ total lending of bank b in year t respectively.
Municipal Spreadt is the spread of municipal borrowing rates over deposit
rates. The vector X ft contains Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio as time-varying
bank-specific control. The vector δ
f
t collects county- and time- fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered by county and presented in parentheses. Data are
annual, sample period is 2010-2016.
∗
p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 3: Firm-level investment—Baseline results
Dependent variable: Investment Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SPK −1.317∗∗∗ −1.047∗∗∗ −0.883∗∗ −0.822∗∗ −0.881∗∗
(0.410) (0.368) (0.367) (0.369) (0.371)
SPK× η 1.968∗∗∗ 1.392∗∗∗ 1.364∗∗∗ 1.307∗∗∗ 1.345∗∗∗
(0.251) (0.185) (0.185) (0.187) (0.193)
Firm size −0.368∗∗∗ −0.369∗∗∗ −0.370∗∗∗ −0.368∗∗∗









(0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes No No No
County-Time FE No No Yes Yes No
Sector-Time FE No No No Yes No
County-Sector-Time FE No No No No Yes
Clustered SE County-Sector County-Sector County-Sector County-Sector County-Sector
Observations 1,886,235 1,865,386 1,865,386 1,865,386 1,865,386
R
2
0.356 0.372 0.372 0.373 0.417
Note: The table shows the results from the firm-level panel regression
INV
f
t = α× SPK
f
t + β× η f × SPK
f
t + β









t are the investment rate and the local bank spread of firm f in year t respectively. η
f
is the firm’s substitution elasticity, which is measured by firm’s total assets size. The vector X ft contains
equity share and firm size as time-varying firm-specific controls. The vector δ
f
t collects a range of fixed
effects, including firm fixed effects, time fixed effects, county-time, sector-time and/or county-sector-time
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county and sector and presented in parentheses. Data are
annual, sample period is 2010-2016.
∗
p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 4: Firm-level investment—results with different measures of substitution elasticities η
Dependent variable: Investment Rate
Firm size Employment Age Number of banks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SPK −0.881∗∗ −3.480∗∗∗ −0.925∗∗ −1.598∗∗∗
(0.371) (0.822) (0.363) (0.496)
SPK× η 1.345∗∗∗ 3.158∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 1.488∗∗∗
(0.193) (0.357) (0.012) (0.331)
η −0.023∗∗∗
(0.003)
Firm size −0.368∗∗∗ −0.310∗∗∗ −0.371∗∗∗ −0.371∗∗∗









(0.032) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
County-Sector-Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE County-Sector County-Sector County-Sector County-Sector
Observations 1,865,386 420,716 1,916,405 1,916,405
R
2
0.417 0.520 0.422 0.422
Note: The table shows the results from the firm-level panel regression
INV
f
t = α× SPK
f
t + β× η f × SPK
f
t + β









t are the investment rate and the local bank spread of firm f in year t
respectively. η f is the firm’s substitution elasticity, which measure is defined in the column
headings. The vector X ft contains equity share and firm size as time-varying firm-specific
controls. The vector δ
f
t includes firm fixed effects and county-sector-time fixed effects. Stan-
dard errors are clustered by county and sector and presented in parentheses. Data are annual,
sample period is 2010-2016.
∗
p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 5: Firm-level evidence on bank lending and interest rate
Dependent variable:




SPK× η 2.186∗ −0.132∗∗∗
(1.140) (0.045)





Firm FE Yes Yes
County-Sector-Time FE Yes Yes





Note: The table shows the results from the firm-level panel regression
Y ft = α× SPK
f
t + β× η f × SPK
f
t + β







t = [Bank Liability Growth
f




t is the local bank
spreadof firm f in year t. η f is the firm’s substitution elasticity, which ismeasured
by firm’s total assets size. The vector X ft contains equity share and firm size as
time-varying firm-specific controls. The vector δ
f
t includes firm fixed effects and
county-sector-time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county and






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Firm-level evidence based on granular IV
Dependent variable:
Investment Bank Liability Growth Interest Rate
(1) (2) (3)
SPK −0.997∗∗∗ −7.177∗∗ 0.340∗
(0.366) (3.001) (0.194)
[F1stage=2620 ] [F1stage=2513] [F1stage=2362]
[Fcond=5300.3] [Fcond=4744.2] [Fcond=4752.4]
[p<0.001] [p<0.001 ] [p<0.001 ]
SPK× η 1.419∗∗∗ 2.436∗∗ −0.150∗∗∗
(0.191) (1.195) (0.046)
[F1stage=674,6 ] [F1stage=1105 ] [F1stage=1012 ]
[Fcond=5178.4] [Fcond=3724.8] [Fcond=3903.5]
[p<0.001] [p<0.001 ] [p<0.001 ]







Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
County-Sector-Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE County-Sector County-Sector County-Sector




Note: The table shows the results of the second stage from the firm-level panel IV regression

















t ,Bank Liability Growth
f








η f × SPK ft are in-
strumented using the granular instrumental variable (GIV) defined in equation (10). See section
5.4 for details. SPK
f
t is the local bank spread of firm f in year t. η
f
is the firm’s substitution
elasticity, which is measured by firm’s total assets size. The vector X ft contains equity share
and firm size as time-varying firm-specific controls. The vector δ
f
t includes firm fixed effects
and county-sector-time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county and sector and
presented in parentheses. F1stage in curly brackets denotes F-statistic from the first stage. Fcond
in squared brackets shows tests for weak identification based on the conditional F-statistics by
Sanderson andWindmeijer (2016). The associated p-values are bootstrapped. Data are annual,
sample period is 2010-2016.
∗
p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 8: Municipal public shares and local public debt—bank-level regressions
Dependent variable: Bank’s Share of Municipal Lending, λ
Local Public Debt in 2010 0.087
∗∗∗
(0.022)
Local Public Debt in 2010×FP −6.700∗∗
(2.633)
SPK-Dummy×Local Public Debt in 2010 0.108
(0.092)













Note: The table shows the results from the bank-level panel regressions
λbt =γ× LocalPublicDebtc2010(b) + δ× LocalPublicDebtc2010(b)× FP
s(b)
t
+ φ1b × LocalPublicDebtc2010(b) + ρ1b × LocalPublicDebtc2010(b)× FP
s(b)
t
+ ψ1b × FP
s(b)





whereλbt is the public debt share on local bank b’s balance sheet, FP
s(b)
t is the pressure for fiscal consolidation
in state s(b) inwhich bank b is located and LocalPublicDebtc2010(b) is the ratio of outstanding local public
debt to local GDP in municipality (county) c(b), at the beginning of the sample period (2010) and 1b is an
indicator dummy that is one if bank b is a savings bank. Controls contains bank controls as well as state-
and timefixed effects. Standard errors are clusteredby county andpresented inparentheses. Data are annual,
sample period is 2010-2016.
∗
p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 9: Firm lending rates and municipal lending shares—local fiscal pressure as IV
Firm Interest Rate
savings banks cooperative banks
Λ( f it) 1.085 −0.483
(1.080) (4.243)
[F1stage=10.87 ] [F1stage=5.85 ]
[Fcond=22.24] [Fcond=11.91 ]
[p<0.001] [p<0.01 ]
Λ×Municipal Spread (fit) −1.456∗∗ −0.613
(0.0.679) (4.042)
[F1stage=11.54] [F1stage= 5.67 ]
[Fcond=23.95] [Fcond=11.61 ]
[p<0.001] [p<0.01 ]
Deposit share −1.718∗∗∗ −1.817∗∗
(0.645) (0.784)
(log) Total assets −0.060∗∗∗ −0.099∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.015)
State-Time FE Yes Yes
Clustered SE County County
Observations 2,742 6,514
R2 0.828 0.735
Note: The table shows results of panel IV regressions of banks’ average firm lending rates on
their municipal lending shares of the form
iF,bt = a× Λ̂bt + b×
̂[Λbt ×Municipal Spreadt] + β′Xbt + δbt + ubt
for local savings banks (left column) and local cooperative banks (right column). Here, iF,bt is
the average firm lending rate of bank b in year t. Λbt =
1
1−λ , where λ is the public (munic-
ipal) debt share of a banks’ total lending and Municipal Spreadt is the spread of municipal
borrowing rates over deposit rates. The vector X ft contains deposit share and total assets as
time-varying bank-specific control. The vector δ
f
t collects state-time fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered by county and provided in parentheses. The left column reports results for
local public banks, the right column for local cooperative banks. Both regressions use local fis-
cal pressure (LFP
b
t ) as defined in equation (13) and its interaction with the municipal spread as
instruments. F1stage in curly brackets denotes F-statistic from the first stage. Fcond in squared
brackets shows tests for weak identification based on the conditional F-statistics by Sander-




Table 10: Firm-level evidence with austerity-induced SPK
Dependent variable:
Investment Bank Liability Growth Interest Rate
(1) (2) (3)
SPK −0.635∗∗∗ −3.505∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗
(0.195) (1.311) (0.089)
SPK× η 0.820∗∗∗ 1.264∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.532) (0.024)







Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
County-Sector-Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE County-Sector County-Sector County-Sector




Note: The table shows the results from the firm-level panel regression











t ,Bank Liability Growth
f
t , Interest Rate
f
t ].SPKA, ft is the austerity in-
duced component of local public bank spread of firm f in year t that we obtained from the
IV regression presented in Table 9. η f is the firm’s substitution elasticity, which is measured
by firm’s total assets size. The vector X ft contains equity share and firm size as time-varying
firm-specific controls. The vector δ
f
t includes firm fixed effects and county-sector-time fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered by county and sector and presented in parentheses. Data
are annual, sample period is 2010-2016.
∗
p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
A Appendix: Theoretical framework
We consider a stylized model based on Brunnermeier and Koby (2020) which we extend to include a
statutory requirement for the local public banks to engage in public (municipal) lending. Banks engage
in public lending to local municipalities or in private lending to local firms. The bank’s problem is to
maximize its equity E1 in the next period:
E1 = (1 + iF)F + (1 + iP)P− (1 + iD)D (A.1)
where F is private lending to firms, P is public (municipal) lending and D are deposits and iF, iP and
iD the associated interest rates. The bank’s decision is subject to the balance sheet identity
F + P = D + E0 (A.2)





in which municipal lending P has a risk weight of zero.
Local public banks (savings banks) differ from local cooperative banks because they face a statutory
requirement to engage in lending to the local public sector. We formalize this requirement in the
simplest possible manner as a lower bound λ on the fraction of its balance sheet that the savings bank





We call this the statutory public lending constraint. It arises from the bank’s specific statutory
mandate and/or from the direct political control of municipalities over the local public banks.
Importantly, we assume that banks have market power in their lending market. Firms’ loan de-
mand function F is downward sloping in iF, so that F′ = dF/diF < 0. We also assume that there is
market power in deposit markets, with deposit supply upward sloping in iD, so that D′ = dD/diD >
0. The interest rate on public loans, iP, is exogenous and the bank chooses the optimal P subject to its
statutory constraint.
With these assumptions we can write the Lagrangian as
L =(1 + iF)F + (1 + iP)P− (1 + iD)D− µ (F + P− D− E0)






which leads to the following first-order conditions:
∂L
∂iF
= F + (1 + iF)F′ − µF′ − χψF′ − θλF′ = 0 (A.5)
∂L
∂iD
= −D− (1 + iD)D′ + µD′ = 0⇐⇒ µ =
D
D′
+ (1 + iD) (A.6)
∂L
∂P









Rearranging yields the following solutions for lending and deposit rates:
iF = iP −
1
εF
+ χψ + θ (A.8)
iD = iP −
1
εD
+ θ(1− λ) (A.9)
where we have used the abbreviations εF =
F′
F < 0 and εD =
D′
D > 0 for the (semi-) elasticities of
loan demand and deposit supply w.r.t the respective interest rate.
As is apparent from (A.8), the bank will charge higher interest rates to its firm customers when-
ever the statutory public lending constraint is binding (θ > 0). A binding statutory public lending
constraint will also induce the bank to try to lengthen its balance sheet by raising additional deposits.
To this end, as can be seen from the third term on the right hand side of equation (A.9), the bank
will increase its deposit rate. By attracting additional deposits, it can partially undo the reduction in
profitable firm-lending that is imposed by the public lending constraint.




− (iP − iD)
1− λ
(A.10)
We refer to θ as the ‘break-even‘ spread since it reflects the increase in the interest rate that the bank
will charge firms to at least partially make up for the opportunity cost of having a part of its balance
sheet being tied up in relatively low-yielding municipal lending (as compared to firm lending). The
break-even spread decreases in the municipal bond spread iP − iD and increases when the statutory
constraint tightens due to an exogenous increase in λ.
We can also see from the first term in the denominator of equation (A.10) how balance sheet con-
straints affect the the break-even spread. A given increase in the lower bound λ on municipal lending
will ceteris paribus have a higher marginal impact on the break-even spread if the bank has a very in-
elastic balance sheet, i.e. if the deposit supply elasticity εD is low. The intution is that for low-elasticity
banks it is costly to increase λ by raising additional funds so that a large part of the increase in λ will
have to come froma reduction of firm lending. Thismeans that there is a stronger rivalry between firm
and municipal lending so that the opportunity costs of municipal lending is higher. We empirically
explore the role of balance sheet elasticity below.
From theory to empirical specification Plugging (A.10) into (A.8), we get the solution for the firm
lending rate that is the basis for the empirical estimation of the break-even spread in regression (4) in
the main body of the paper:
iF = iP −
1
εF





1− λ︸  ︷︷  ︸
a×Λbt
− (iP − iD)
1− λ︸          ︷︷          ︸
b×Λbt×Municipal Spreadt
(A.11)
Importantly, for constrained banks, an increase in the lower bound λ will also increase the observed
levels ofλ. At the same time, a decline in the spread betweenpublic sector borrowing anddeposit rates,
iP− iD will increase the break-even spread and thus the firm-lending rate and it does somore strongly
for banks with high shares of public debt on their books. This is what our empirical specification in
(4) captures.
Note that in our model, the bank’s deposit rate is a decision variable and its optimal values will
differ across banks, depending e.g. on the parameters εD and εF and on λ. Our empirical implemen-
tation in (4) uses the municipal spread defined as the difference between the municipal bond rate and
the average deposit rate across all German banks. Focusing on this common component across all
banks allows us to isolate the exogenous part of the decline in the difference iP − iD.
Exploringbalance sheet elasticity Toexplore the role of balance sheet elasticity, as captured by εD,
we split the sample of savings banks into two, depending on the banks deposit dependence as captured
by the deposit-loan ratio. We associate banks with high (low) deposit dependence with a low (high)
balance sheet elasticity. Deposits are tpyically a very stable funding base but it is also relatively hard to
attract additional deposit funding as compared to e.g. wholesale funding. In Table B.5 we re-run our
bank-level regressions (4) on the two sub-samples. We find that the coefficient a on the stand-alone
termΛ, which according to themodel should correspond to1/εD, is higher for the deposit-dependent
savings banks. Hence, in line with our conjecture, deposit-dependent banks have less elastic balance
sheets overall.
Conversely, for deposit-dependent (low-elasticity) banks the coefficient b on the interaction Λ×
Municipal Spreadt is somewhat less precisely estimated (though not significantly different frommi-
nus unity). By contrast, for banks with high elasticity, the point estimate remains very close to neg-
ative unity and highly significant. Again this is consistent with the predictions of the model. Banks
that have considerable market power in their local deposit markets have relatively more leeway to set
deposit rates independently, while refinancing rates of high-elasticity banks are likely to comovemore
strongly with the country-wide market rates that we use in our regressions here.
Appendix B. Additional tables and results
Table B.1: Firm-level evidence—results with placebo SPK
Dependent variable:
Investment Bank Liability Growth Interest Rate
(1) (2) (3)
SPKplacebo −0.409 1.161 −0.063
(0.510) (2.313) (0.206)
SPKplacebo × η 1.190∗∗∗ 0.761 −0.051
(0.296) (0.759) (0.084)







Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
County-Sector-Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE County-Sector County-Sector County-Sector




Note: The table shows the results from the firm-level panel regression
Y ft = α× SPK
f
placebo,t + β× η
f × SPK fplacebo,t + β









t ,Bank Liability Growth
f




placebo,t is the placebo local
bank spread of firm f in year t that was constructed for the local cooperative banks as in Table
2 column 3. η f is the firm’s substitution elasticity, which is measured by firm’s total assets size.
The vector X ft contains equity share and firm size as time-varying firm-specific controls. The
vector δ
f
t includes firm fixed effects and county-sector-time fixed effects. Standard errors are




Table B.2: Firm-level investment—extended set of firm-specific controls
Dependent variable: Investment Rate
Firm size Employment Age Number of banks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SPK −8.323∗∗∗ −6.301∗∗∗ −4.492∗∗∗ −5.595∗∗∗
(1.684) (1.765) (1.226) (1.145)
SPK× η 2.572∗∗∗ 2.285∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 2.027∗∗∗
(0.659) (0.664) (0.022) (0.472)
η −0.033∗∗∗
(0.007)
Firm size −0.394∗∗∗ −0.283∗∗∗ −0.399∗∗∗ −0.399∗∗∗



























(0.018) (0.026) (0.018) (0.018)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
County-Sector-Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE County-Sector County-Sector County-Sector County-Sector
Observations 180,199 103,675 186,930 186,930
R
2
0.672 0.636 0.676 0.676
Note: The table shows the results from the firm-level panel regression
INV
f
t = α× SPK
f
t + β× η f × SPK
f
t + β









t are the investment rate and the local bank spread of firm f in year t respectively.
η f is the firm’s substitution elasticity, which measure is defined in the column headings. The vector X ft
contains equity share, firm size, cashflow share and revenue growth as time-varying firm-specific controls.
The vector δ
f
t includes firm fixed effects and county-sector-time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.5: Firm lending rates and municipal lending shares—results for high and low deposit-
dependent savings banks
Dependent variable: Firm Interest Rate
high deposit-to-loans share low deposit-to-loans share
Λ 1.917∗∗∗ 1.968∗∗∗ 1.288∗ 1.070
(0.487) (0.578) (0.710) (0.857)
Λ×Municipal Spread −0.592∗∗ −0.473 −1.150∗∗∗ −0.952∗∗
(0.269) (0.332) (0.261) (0.367)
Tier1 Regulatory Capital Ratio 0.009 0.015
(0.007) (0.010)
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Region Region Region Region
Observations 1,420 981 1,424 974
R
2
0.915 0.924 0.903 0.905
Note: The table shows the results from the bank-level panel regressions run sep-
arately for the sample of of Sparkassen with above (high, columns 1 and 2) and
below (low, columns 3 and 4) the median deposit-to-loans share
iF,bt = a×Λbt + b×Λbt ×Municipal Spreadt + β′Xbt + δbt + ubt
where iF,bt and Λ
b
t are the average firm lending rate and the public (munic-
ipal) debt share of a banks’ total lending of bank b in year t respectively.
Municipal Spreadt is the spread of municipal borrowing rates over deposit
rates. The vector X ft contains Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio as time-varying
bank-specific control. The vector δ
f
t collects county- and time- fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered by county and presented in parentheses. Data are
annual, sample period is 2010-2016.
∗
p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
